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NOTE 
Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation. for the 
Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment 
Condition 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after the enactment of Title VII, 1 the federal judiciary 
confronted its first Title VII case in which sexual harassment2 was 
the primary allegation.3 In the next three-and-one-half years, six 
more claims of sexual harassment reached federal district courts, 4 
and three federal circuit courts of appeal reviewed lower court hold-
ings. 5 
Neither these cases nor the considerable joumalistic6 and aca-
demic7 attention they received reveals a consensus regarding the ap-
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 241 (codified 
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970)). 
2. This Note defines a sexual advance as a physical or verbal request for sexual interaction. 
Sexual harassment is defined as a sexual advance made with an explicit or implicit threat of 
adverse job consequences for a failure to comply or as one adversely affecting a condition of 
employment. 
Although the precise extent of sexual harassment is unknown, there is some evidence that it 
occurs significantly often in the employment context. Bralove, A Cold Shoulder: Career Wo-
men .Decry Sexual Harassment by Bosses and Clients, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 1 
(Working Women United's informal survey of 155 working women indicated that 92% be-
lieved sexual harassment was a serious problem and 70% had experienced some form of sexual 
harassment on the job). 
3. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), revd. sub nom. Barnes v. 
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
4. Munford v. James T. Baines & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Tomkins v. 
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 
1977); Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 7586 (E.D. Va. 1976), revd. sub 
nom. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F. 2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of 
America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 
1976); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (!). Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural 
grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
5. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 
1977). 
6. E.g., Bernstein, Sexual Harassment on the Job, HARPERS BAZAAR, Aug. 1976, at '12; 
Lindsey, Sexual Harassment on the Job and How To Stop It, Ms., Nov. 1977, at 47; Pogrebin, 
17te Working Woman: Sex Harassment, LADIES' HOME J., June 1977, at 24; Safron, What Men 
.Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 
149. 
7. E.g., Ginsburg & Koreski, Sexual Advances by an Employee's Supervisor: A Sex-.Dis-
crimination Violation of Title VII?, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 83 (1977); Comment, Employment 
.Discrimination-Sexual Harassment and Title VII-Female Employees' Claim Alleging Verbal 
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propriate application of Title VII to cases of sexual harassment. 
This Note, therefore, examines the application of Title VII to the 
problem of sexual harassment and suggests a coherent framework 
for analyzing the issues. After a brief discussion and evaluation of 
the cases, sexual harassment will be analyzed from the perspective of 
the Title VII case law of other types of discrimination. Analogies 
from these cases suggest that Title VII, as enacted by Congress and 
interpreted by the Judiciary, prohibits making sexual cooperation a 
condition of employment. 
Since Title VII applies only to employment,8 this Note considers 
only those circumstances in which the alleged victim of sexual ha-
rassment is an employee and the individual allegedly making the 
sexual advance is either the employer or a fellow employee. Of 
course, except in the case of claims of discrimination in federal em-
ployment,9 Title VII is not an exclusive remedy within the employ-
ment context.10 Alternative causes of action for employment 
discrimination may be based upon the United States Constitution,11 
other federal statutes, 12 state employment laws,13 traditional com-
and Physical Advances by a Male Supervisor Dismissed as Nonactionable-Come v. Bausch & 
Lomb, Inc., 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 148 (1976); 17 S. TEX. L.J. 409 (1976). 
8. Title VII § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
9. Title VII preempts all other statutory or common-law causes of action against the fed-
eral government for employment discrimination. The Supreme Court has commented: 
The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of§ 717 are inconsistent with the 
petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy afforded by§ 717(c) was designed merely 
to supplement other putati~
1
~J::Cdicial relief. His view fails, in our estimation, to accord 
due weight to the fact that" · e these other supposed remedies,§ 717 does not contem-
pla~e .merely judicial relief. Rather, it provides for a careful blend of administrative and 
Judicial enforcement powers. 
Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
IO. ''Title VII was envisioned as an independent statutory authority meant to provide an 
aggrieved individual with an additional remedy to redress employment discrimination." H.R. 
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971); "Despite Title VII's range and its design as a 
comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment, the ag-
grieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to 
Title VII in his search for relief." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 4S4, 4S9 
(1975). 
11. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute permitting servicemen but 
not service women to claim spouse as a "dependent" without regard to actual dependence 
violates due process clause of fifth amendment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (mandatory 
statutory preference for men as estate administrators violates equal protection clause of four-
teenth amendment). 
12. Cf. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 4S0 F.2d 796, 797 (6th Cir. 1971) (fitle VII does not 
preempt the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970), and an action for 
discrimination in employment may therefore be brought under that act); United Packing-
house, Food & Allied Workers Intl. Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133 n.11 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969) (NLRB has concurrent jurisdiction ~nder the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), to deal with some forms of employment discrimi-
nation). 
13. Title VII§ 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (fitle VII does not relieve 
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mon-law contract theories, 14 and collective bargaining contracts.15 
Furthermore, statutory civil causes of action against the individual 
g~ilty of the harassment, 16 as well as criminal sanctions, 17 may be 
available. Nevertheless, Title VII may well provide the most direct 
and specific remedy for victims of sexual harassment within the em-
ployment context; 18 the presence of uniform federal statutory 
prohibitions and the development of more consistent precedent in-
terpreting those provisions will furnish the courts the tools to elimi-
nate sexual cooperation as an employment condition. 
II. THE FOUNDATION: TITLE VII 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted by the United States 
Congress on July 2, 1964.19 Title VII20 of this legislation deals •with 
equal employment opportunities. Although Title VII is broad in its 
coverage and content, its core is section 703(a), which provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.21 
For the purposes of Title VII, "the term •Jmployer' means a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce . . . and any agent of 
such a person, but such term does not include . . . the United 
States."22 
To effectuate Title VII's purpose of providing a safe and effective 
means for resolving complaints of employment discrimination, Con-
any person from liability under any state law except one requiring employment practices un-
lawful under Title VII). 
14. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,316 A.2d 549 (1974) (termination by em-
ployer in retaliation for rejection of sexual advances constitutes breach of employment con-
tract). See also 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 700 (1975). 
15. q. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (arbitration is a concur-
rent, alternative remedy for employment discrimination). 
16. E.g., D.C. Code§ 22-2304 (1973) (false charges of unchastity). 
17. q. D.C. Code§ 22-2305 (1973) (blackmail). The Michigan legislature is considering 
a bill prohibiting employers from using their power to secure sexual favors from employees. 
Detroit Free Press, May 4, 1978, at 3, col. 2. 
18. Accord, Whittier & Whittier, Employment .Discrimination: Alternative Remedies to Title 
VII, 43 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 296, 333 (1975). This Note focuses on individual causes of action 
under Title VII. While a class action might be maintainable under appropriate circumstances, 
an individual action will generally be quicker and more effective for individuals in those cir-
cumstances. 
19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 
1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000n-6 (1970)). 
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII§§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 
1975). 
21. Title VII§ 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970). 
22. Title VII§ 70l(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V. 1975). 
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gress included Section 704, which prohibits employers from retali-
ating against employees who initiate complaints under Title VIl.23 
In 1972, Congress added Section 717 to extend the coverage of Title 
VII to federal employees.24 
These are the crucial provisions of Title VII. Although the legis-
lative history of Section 703 reveals that the provisions prohibiting 
discrimination based on sex were added in a last-minute attempt to 
prevent the passage of Title VIl,25 the legislative history of the 1972 
addition of Section 717 evidences Congress's commitment to elimi-
nating employment discrimination based on sex: "Discrimination 
against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited em-
ployment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social 
con"em given to any type of unlawful discrimination."26 The legis-
lative history further reveals that Title VII is not confined to explicit 
acts of discrimination nor to discriminations based solely on sex;27 
any decision in wltj'cb. sex is a factor is discriminatory, even if other, 
legitimate, factors aiso motivated the decision. In essence, sex is to 
be treated like any -other prohibited ground for discrimination.28 
While judicial interpretation is important, an analysis of sexual ha-
rassment must be built on this foundation of statutory language and 
legislative declaration. 
Ill. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE LAW UNDER TITLE VII 
In five of the seven cases which have created the substantive law 
23. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against 
any of his employees ... because [such employee] has opposed any practice made an unlaw-
ful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge . . . under this 
subchapter." Title VII § 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
24. "All personnel actions affecting employees . . . in executive agencies . . . and in those 
units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in 
the competitive service . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin." Title VII, § 717, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
Though its language differs from that of§ 703(a), the Supreme Court has said in construing 
§ 717, "the substantive antidiscrimination law embraced in Title VII was carried over and 
applied to the Federal Government." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 (1974). 
25. See llO CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). See generally Wells, Sex 
Discrimination and Title VII, 43 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 273, 274-76 (1975). 
26. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in (1972] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao, 
NEWS 2137, 2141. 
27. 110 CONG. REc. 2728, 13,825 (1964). 
28. The only exception to this broad proposition is that an employer may hire an individ-
ual "on the basis of his religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances where religion, 
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." Title VII § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(e) (1970). This exception does not apply to race. See generally Sirota, Sex Discrimi-
nation: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qual!ftcation, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1025 (1977). 
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in this area, 29 the district courts initially held that a claim alleging 
sexual harassment does not state a cause of action under Title VIl.3° 
Three of the district court decisions were reversed on appeal3 1 on 
three different interpretations of the statute. 
In one of the earliest sexual harassment cases, Corne v. Bausch 
and Lomb, Inc. ,32 the two plaintiffs alleged that they had had to re-
sign their jobs to avoid their supervisor's verbal and physical sexual 
advances. The court held that they had failed to state a claim for 
relief under Title VII. The court noted that the discriminatory con-
duct in prior Title VII sex discrimination cases arose out of company 
policies, and it found that the conduct alleged was not such a policy, 
but was "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or 
mannerism" of the supervisor.33 The court read Section 703(a) as 
applying only to discrimination on the part of the employer and 
stated that it was inapplicable to sexual advances by another em-
ployee "even though he be in a supervisory capacity where such 
complained of acts or conduct had no relationship to the nature of 
the employment."34 
In dictum, the court commented that if Title VII were applicable, 
it would be "ludicrous" to find no Title VII violation when the al-
leged conduct had also been directed to males.35 Furthermore, the 
court speculated that an employer would be forced to employ only 
asexual employees to avoid lawsuits every time one employee made 
29. The seven cases are: Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (D. Colo. 
1978); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd, 568 
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 7586 (E.D. Va. 
1976), revd sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); 
Millerv. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 
654 (D.D.C. 1976); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated 
on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
123 (D.D.C. 1974), revd sub nom. Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
30. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd, 568 
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 7586 (E.D. Va. 
1976), revd sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552'F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); 
Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 
390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); 
Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), revd sub nom. Barnes v. Castle, 
561 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
31. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd, 568 
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 7586 (E.D. Va. 
1976), revd sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); 
Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), revd sub nom. Barnes v. Castle, 
561 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
32. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
33. 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
34. 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
35. 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
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sexual advances to another.36 
In Williams v. Saxbe,37 the plaintiff alleged that after she refused 
her supervisor's sexual advance, he harassed, humiliated, and even-
tually fired her. The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, taking an expansive view of Title VII, held that retalia-
tory actions of a supervisor taken because a subordinate declined his 
sexual advances constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. 
The court found a cause of action under Section 717(a), since 
''the conduct of the plaintiff's supervisor created an artificial barrier 
to employment which was placed before one gender and not the 
other, despite the fact that both genders were similarly situated."38 
The employer's argument, that the supervisor did not discriminate 
against women, but only against people who refused to accede to his 
sexual demands, was summarily dismissed by the court, as was the 
employer's contention that this conduct could not be sex discrimina-
tion since application of Title VII should not depend upon the sexual 
preference of the supervisor. 39 The court reasoned that violations of 
Title VII could be found whenever a supervisor approached only 
members of one sex, but that no violation of Title VII would occur if 
a supervisor made advances to subordinates of both genders.40 
The court concluded that there was no cause of action unless the 
supervisor's conduct constituted an employer policy or practice.41 
Echoing Come, the court implied that an employer is not liable for 
personal, isolated instances of sexual harassment.42 
In Miller v. Bank of America,43 the United States District Court 
for Northern California dismissed a complaint in which the plaintiff 
alleged that her supervisor promised her a better job if she would be 
sexually cooperative and that he had her fired when she refused. 
The court phrased the issue as "whether Title VII was intended to 
hold an employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and unau-
thorized sex misconduct of one employee to another."44 The court 
acknowledged that "there may be situations in which a sex discrimi-
nation action can be maintained for an employer's active, or tacit 
36. 390 F. Supp. at 164. 
37. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). 
38. 413 F. Supp. at 657-58. 
39. 413 F. Supp. at 659 n.6. 
40. 413 F. Supp. at 659 n.6. 
41. 413 F. Supp. at 660. 
42. 413 F. Supp. at 660-61. 
43. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
44. 418 F. Supp. at 234. 
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approval, of a personnel policy requiring sex favors as a condition of 
employment," but recommended judicial restraint absent "specific 
factual allegations describing an employer policy which in its appli-
cation imposes or permits a consistent, as distinguished from iso-
lated, sex-based discrimination on a definable employee group."45 
Concerned that under the plaintifrs theory ".flirtations of the small-
est order would give rise to liability,"46 the court concluded that "the 
attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex 
phenomenon and it is probable that this-attraction plays at least a 
subtle part in most personnel decisions."47 
The United States District Court for Eastern Michigan held that 
the plaintiff in Mueford v. James T. Barnes & Co. 48 stated a proper 
cause of action by alleging that she was discharged for refusing sex-
ual relations with her supervisor. The court cited earlier sexual ha-
rassment cases to show Jhat sexual harassment is prohibited sex 
discrimination under Title VIl.49 The plaintiffs supervisor was a 
proper defendant because he was an agent of the employer and was 
responsible for the alleged discrimination.50 The supervisor's supe-
rior and the employer were also proper defendants, since they failed 
to investigate the complaint of sexual harassment.51 The court, 
however, declined to hold the employer automatically and vicari-
ously liable for the discriminatory acts of its supervisors. 52 
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, in Garber v. Saxon Industries, Inc. , 53 dismissed 
in a single sentence an employee's allegation that she was fired be-
cause she refused to engage in illicit sexual relations with her imme-
diate superior. According to the court, the plaintiff had not set forth 
a claim cognizable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 54 How-
45. 418 F. Supp. at 236. The court noted that the plaintiff had failed to file a complaint 
with the employer's employee relations department, and that the employer had a policy of 
discouraging and disciplining sexual advances. Since the plaintiff had not given the employer 
an opportunity to investigate her complaint by means of this internal procedure, there was no 
showing that the suprevisor's actions had the tacit approval of the employer. 418 F. Supp. at 
235-36. 
46. 418 F. Supp. at 236. 
47. 418 F. Supp. at 236. 
48. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
49. 441 F. Supp. at 465-66. 
50. 441 F. Supp. at 466. 
51. 441 F. Supp. at 466. 
52. 441 F. Supp. at 466. 
53. 14 EmpL Prac. Dec. ,i 7586 (E.D. Va. 1976), revd. sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Business 
Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). 
54. 14 EmpL Prac. Dec. at ,i 7586. 
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ever, in an equally brief per curiam opinion, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order 
to dismiss and remanded the case.55 The court found that "the com-
plaint and its exhibits, liberally construed, allege an employer policy 
or acquiescence in a practice of compelling female employees to sub-
mit to the sexual advances of their male supervisor in violation of 
Title VII."56 Evidently the court viewed a Title VII cause of action 
as requiring an employer policy or acquiescence in a practice, but 
additional guidance from the Fourth Circuit is precluded by the 
opinion's brevity. 
Then, in a comprehensive opinion, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Barnes v. Costle57 reversed a district court 
dismissal58 of a complaint in which the plaintiff alleged that, because 
she rebuffed her director's repeated sexual advances and his intima-
tions that an affair would enhance her career, he abolished her job. 
The court of appeals found that retention of the plaintiffs job was 
conditioned upon sexual cooperation with her supervisor, a condi-
tion which her supervisor did not apply to male employees.59 Find-
ing that it was "enough that gender is a factor contributing to the 
discrimination in a substantial way," the court concluded that her 
"gender, just as much as her cooperation, was an indispensable fac-
tor in the job-retention condition" imposed by her supervisor.60 
Addressing the issue of the employer's liability for acts of its su-
pervisors, the court observed, "Generally speaking, an employer is 
chargeable with Title VII violations occasioned by discriminatory 
practices of supervisory personnel."61 Citing Miller,62 the court 
conceded that "should a supervisor contravene employer policy 
without the employer's knowledge and the consequences are rectified 
when discovered, the employer may be relieved from responsibility 
55. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). 
56. 552 F.2d at 1032. 
57. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
58. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), revd sub nom. Barnes v. 
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The district court reasoned that sexual harassment was 
not the kind of discriminatory conduct contemplated by Title VII, but was a "controversy 
underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship." 13 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. at 124. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not discriminated against because she 
refused to comply with her director's sexual demands: "Regardless of how inexcusable the 
conduct of plaintiffs supervisor might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier to 
continued employment based on plaintiffs sex." 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 124. 
59. 561 F.2d at 990. 
60. 561 F.2d at 990, 992. 
61. 561 F.2d at 993. 
62. Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See text at notes 43-47 
supra. 
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under Title VII;"63 the employer in this case, however, introduced no 
evidence that a policy against harassment was implemented, or even 
existed.64 Addressing the question whether such an employer prac-
tice or policy was a necessary element of a cause of action, the court 
held that a single instance of discrimination could support an indi-
vidual suit under Title VII.65 
The most recent case decided upon the grounds of sexual harass-
ment is Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. 66 The Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a district court holding67 that 
there is no cognizable claim of sex discrimination when a female 
employee's continued employment is conditioned upon her submis-
sion to the sexual advances of a male supervisor.68 The court con-
centrated on the basic prerequisites of a Title VII claim, "that the 
acts complained of constituted a condition of employment, and that 
63. 561 F.2d at 993. 
64. 561 F.2d at 993. 
65. 561 F.2d at 993-94. In a lengthy concurring opinion, Judge MacKinnon argued that 
the case should be reversed and remanded only upon the narrower ground that the employer 
knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct of the supervisor. 561 F.2d at 995-
1001. MacKinnon first argued that because acts of sexual harassment are outside the supervi-
sor's scope of employment the employer is not liable under the common law of vicarious liabil-
ity. 561 F.2d at 995-96. Then MacKinnon considered the wording and policies of Title VII 
and the National Labor Relations Act, which define an employer to include "any agent." 561 
F.2d at 997-98. Having found no explicit statement that employers are vicariously liable 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, MacKinnon listed three possible rationales for 
imposing vicarious liability upon the employer: (1) the employer is in a position to know of 
discriminatory behavior, (2) the employer can take preventive steps, and (3) imposing vicari-
ous liability causes the employer to be especially careful. 561 F.2d at 998-99. MacKinnon 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to find that the employer knew or should have 
known of the supervisor's discriminatory conduct and that the employer was therefore vicari-
ously liable. 561 F.2d at 999-1001. 
66. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
67. 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.NJ. 1976), revd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
68. The United States District Court for New Jersey held that sexual harassment of a fe-
male employee by a male supervisor does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII, 
but that the summary dismissal of a female employee for filing a grievance alleging sex dis-
crimination was cognizable under Title VII. The plaintiff had alleged that her supervisor 
made sexual advances toward her and threatened her physically and economically. She com-
plained to the company and sought and obtained a transfer to a less desirable job. Subse-
quently the plaintiff was fired; she alleged that she was fired because her former supervisor 
wished to retaliate for her refusal to grant him sexual favors and because the company wished 
to retaliate for her having filed complaints. 422 F. Supp. at 555. 
The court said that Title VII does not provide a federal tort remedy for sexual attacks 
which "occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley." 422 F. Supp. at 556. The 
court, fearing that "[an) invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if 
a once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time," concluded that sexual harass-
ment was beyond the intended scope of Title VII. 422 F. Supp. at 557. 
The court did find, however, that firing a female employee for filing a complaint of sexual 
harassment could be discrimination in favor of the retained male supervisor. Regardless of the 
underlying subject of the complaint, discharge without investigation of a person who com-
plained of illegal discrimination violates Title VII. The court therefore denied the employer's 
motion to dismiss this part of the plaintifrs claim. 422 F. Supp. at 557. 
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this condition was imposed by the employer on the basis of sex."69 
The court had no trouble concluding that the first requirement had 
been satisfied, noting that the fact that sexual advances occurred 
within the employment context was strong evidence of a job-related 
condition.7° The second issue, whether the incident was company 
policy or a purely personal incident, was found to be a question for 
the fact finder.71 The court implied that an employer is not liable 
for a "purely personal incident,"72 but found that plaintiffs allega-
tion that her employer either knowingly or constructively acquiesced 
in the supervisor's conduct was sufficient to withstand a motion to 
dismiss.73 
The third essential attribute of the claim, that the discrimination 
be on the basis of sex, was also satisfied, according to the court. 
Plaintiffs claim that "her status as a female was the motivating fac-
tor in the supervisor's conditioning her continued employment on 
compliance with his sexual demands"74 was a sufficient allegation of 
Title VII sex discrimination, since "[i]t is only necessary to show that 
gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination."75 
IV. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW 
The seven cases decided to date almost uniformly accept as basic 
that Title VII was enacted to prohibit discrimination in employment 
on the basis of sex and that Title VII is to be liberally interpreted in 
order to effectuate its purpose.76 The facts of these cases are not 
meaningfully distinguishable: the source of the harassment, 77 the 
kind of harassment,78 the resulting change in the plaintiffs employ-
69. 568 F.2d at 1046. 
70. 568 F.2d at 1046-47. 
71. 568 F.2d at 1047 n.3. 
72. 568 F.2d at 1047 n.3. 
73. 568 F.2d at 1046-47. 
74. 568 F.2d at 1047. 
75. 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4. 
1{,. Come was the major exception to the view that Title VII should be liberally construed, 
See text at notes 32-36 supra. 
77. In each case the harasser was the plaintiffs immediate supervisor. 
78. In each case there was an allegation of an explicit request by the immediate supervisor 
that the plaintiff engage in sexual relations with him. There were also allegations of sexual 
remarks, reprimands, verbal abuse and physical force. Despite variations in the combination, 
repetition, and sequence of these kinds of harassment, each court based its decision on the 
demand for sexual relations. 
The opinions describe the facts of the cases only briefly. The EEOC Charge of Discrimi-
nation form in the Garber case provides a detailed example of a typical allegation: 
When I started in July, Mr. Johnson had nothing but praise for my skills, stating they 
were ten times superior to those of my predecessors. The only reason I was given for my 
termination was my skills were poor, and that I had refused to take a refresher course in 
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ment status,79 and the credence given the plaintiff's claim.80 are all 
similar. The only possible exception is the presence of an explicit 
anti-harassment policy in Mi!ler.81 The courts have divergent posi-
tions as to three legal issues: whether sexual harassment constitutes 
discrimination on the basis of sex, whether a plaintiff must show that 
there is an employer policy or practice of such harassment, and the 
extent to which a supervisor's actions can be attributed to the em-
ployer. 
shorthand. I was reviewed on October 25, 1974, and told then to take the course. I 
called the community college and recreation department and was informed in both in-
stances that courses would not start again until January. I relayed this to Mr. Johnson and 
he said fine. 
On Janu~ 2, when I was informed ofmy termination, I went to an employment agency 
and my skills were tested. With unfamiliar equipment and rather tense circumstances I 
f assed an 80WPM dictation exam and typed 84WPM with 2 errors! feel the real reason I was fired was because I refused to engage in an affair with Mr. 
Johnson. When I first joined the company I found him to be interesting to talk to. I also 
felt sorry for him because he was so emotionally disturbed about the total lack of organi-
zation in the office and his 4th marriage was in the process of falling apart. 
He started coming over to my apartment at all hours of the night. I realize that letting 
him in was my own mistake, but I had no idea of his intentions. I had heard a lot of 
office gossip about the affair between him and the ex-secretary but didn't pay any atten-
tion to it until sometime later when she reappeared and they liad all their afternoon out-
ings and _private calls. 
A short tune later he really started hassling and frightening me to where I had to get my 
neighbors to come over whenever they saw his car. Too many innocent people, including 
other employees, had become involved and I finally got up the guts to tell him to stop 
coming over that I wasn't interested in him. He still persisted. 
On December 12, Mr. Johnson said I owed him a dinner and he wanted to talk to me. I 
agreed to buy him dinner in the hopes we could establish a friendly, but professional 
relationship. It ended up being more of the same until we were joined by two men from 
our corporate offices. r decided I had best wait until another time and when he took me 
home lie really shocked me by telling me he was going to spend the ni&ht with me! I 
ordered him to leave and when he did he slammed the door so hard that 1t cracked and 
once again my neighbors were alarmed. 
He didn't bother me anymore at home and I thought things would be okay then. When 
he terminated me he said he had made the decision the middle of December but out of the 
"goodness of his heart" had decided to postpone telling me until January. 
79. Each plaintiffs employment status worsened significantly after the alleged harassment. 
The plaintiffs in Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); 
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976); Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. ~ 7586 (E.D. Va. 1976), revd sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 
F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); and Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); 
were fired, allegedly in retaliation for refusing the supervisor's sexual demands. The plaintiffs 
in Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural 
grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977), resigned and alleged a constructive discharge. 390 F. 
Supp. at 162. Termination for filing a complaint of sexual harassment was alleged in Tomkins 
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 
1977), while failure to submit to sexual advances allegedly led to the abolition of the plaintiffs 
job and an unfavorable reassignment in Barnes. Except for the constructive discharge in 
Come, the losses were the direct result of an allegedly retaliatory decision by the plaintiffs' 
immediate supervisors. 
80. Since all these cases came upon the defendants' motions to dismiss or on motions for 
summary judgment, the courts were required to consider all the plaintiffs' factual allegations as 
true. 
81. 418 F. Supp. at 234. The legal significance attached to this fact by the court may have 
been overstated. See text at notes 138-46 infra. 
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Two of the district courts held that sexual harassment does not 
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex because gender is inci-
dental to the claim-according to this argument the victim of dis-
crimination is the employee who refuses to furnish sexual favors. 82 
These cases were reversed on appeal by courts which explicitly held 
this kind of conduct to be sex discrimination. 83 The other courts 
which have considered this issue have reached the same conclu-
sion.84 Further, each case addressed the legal significance of 
whether the supervisor's improper conduct reflected an employer 
policy or practice or was only an isolated incident. Each court, ex-
cept the court of appeals in Barnes85 and the Eastern District of 
Michigan in Munford,86 seemed to consider an allegation of an em-
ployer policy or practice essential. 87 The Corne and Miller courts, 
which disallowed the plaintiffs' complaints, found, respectively, that 
the harassment was merely an isolated incident,88 and that the em-
ployer had an express anti-harassment policy. 89 
Directly related to the necessity of an employer policy is the third 
issue, an employer's liability for the acts of supervisory employees. 
Courts disagree as to the extent of an employer's liability for the acts 
of its supervisors: some courts wish to impose what is virtually strict 
82. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), revd. sub nom. 
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 
F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.NJ. 1976), revd., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
83. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988-90 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. 
& Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (3d Cir. 1977). 
84. Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Williams v. 
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976). In Garber, the court apparently assumed that 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination since it held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of 
action under Title VII. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). 
The courts in Come and Miller granted the defendants' motions on other grounds and thus 
did not confront this issue. 
85. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1977), allowed an action to be main-
tained on the basis of a single incident. 
86. Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The court 
did not discuss this issue but allowed the cause of action. 
87. In Come and Williams the courts held there would be no cause of action if the com-
plained of activity was merely an isolated incident and was not indicative of an employer 
policy. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on 
procedural grounds, 562 F. 2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 
(D.D.C. 1976). The Miller court, which in addition took note of an explicit employer policy 
forbidding sexual harassment, concurred in this view. Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. 
Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In Tomkins, the court implied that a finding of an employer 
policy is necessary. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1977). In Garber, the court without discussion held that a cause of action exists when the 
complaint alleges a policy or practice. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 
(4th Cir. 1977). 
88. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural 
grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
8~. Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
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liability, others wish to impose almost no liability at all.90 
The law of sexual harassment, then, is inconsistent, ambiguous, 
and nascent. 
V. THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex 
In the absence of a consistent line of direct precedent, decisions 
in sexual harassment cases must rely on analogies to the Title VII 
cases which have alleged discrimination on the other prohibited 
grounds-race, religion, national origin, and, particularly, conven-
tional sex discrimination.91 Those cases outline the following prin-
ciples for a court which is applying Title VII to a case of sexual 
harassment. A court must ask whether sexual harassment is a bar-
rier to employment92 which discriminates on the basis of sex. Dis-
parate treatment93 of individuals which would not have occurred but 
90. At one extreme, the Come court held that an employer is not liable for acts unrelated 
to the supervisor's job. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), 
vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). At the other extreme Williams, as a 
matter oflaw, imputed the policy of the supervisor to the employer. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. 
Supp. 654, 660 (D.D.C. 1976). 
91. Although EEOC decisions will be cited occasionally, this Note relies primarily upon 
judicial precedent because of the unresolved issue of the proper weight to be accorded to 
agency rulings. Compare the majority opinion in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 
141 (1976): 
This does not mean that EEOC guidelines are not entitled to consideration in determining 
legislative intent. But it does mean that courts properly may accord less weight to sucli 
guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the 
force oflaw, or to regulations which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the 
basis for imposition of liability. 
(citations omitted), with Justice Brennan's dissent: "[P]rior Title VII decisions have consis-
tently acknowledged the unique persuasiveness of EEOC interpretations in this area. These 
prior decisions, rather than providing merely that Commission guidelines are 'entitled to con-
sideration,' as the Court allows, ante, at 141, hold that the EEOC's interpretations should 
receive 'great deference.'" 429 U.S. at 155-56 (citations omitted). 
92. The Supreme Court defined the ambit of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971): "Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is pre-
cisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidi-
ously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." The Court 
recently reiterated that the policy of Title VII is to "prohibit all practices in whatever form 
which create inequality in employment opportunity" and that this policy should have "highest 
priority.'' Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976). 
93. Discrimination may take two forms: 
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most easily understood 
type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discrimina-
tor.y motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of 
differences in treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil 
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII. 
Claims of disparate treatment may be distiniuished from claims that stress "disparate 
impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treat-
ment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and 
cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is 
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for their sex constitutes suflicent unlawful discrimination.94 If a 
prohibited factor, such as the employee's gender, partly motivated 
the employer's decision, the fact that a non-prohibited ground also 
motivated the decision is, for purposes of Title VII, irrelevant.95 
Further, a finding that only some members of one sex were discrimi-
nated against,96 or that there were no similarly situated individuals 
of the opposite sex97 does not preclude the possibility that there was 
unlawful employment discrimination. Finally, courts must be sensi-
tive to the danger that the employer's pretexts might obscure what is 
in fact prohibited conduct.98 
Applying these standards directly to sexual harassment, the ini-
tial issue is whether a sexual advance can be characterized as dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. When sexual advances are made to 
only one sex, discrimination has occurred,99 since members of one 
not required under a disparate impact theory. Either theory may, of course, be applied to 
a particular set of facts. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.15 (1977) (citations omit-
ted). Claims of sexual harassment fall within the disparate treatment category; the allegation 
is that the employer treats the plaintiff less favorably than others because of the plaintiffs sex. 
See Knyzewski v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 7726, at 5576 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1976) ("[W]hen two employees (of different sexes) with work records of comparable 
quality are given disparate punishment for engaging in the same conduct, the defendant is 
guilty of conduct proscribed by Title VII, absent some real and substantial justification for the 
differing treatment"). 
94. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) ("[n]o more is 
required to be shown than that race was a 'but for' cause"). 
95. This is known as "sex-plus" discrimination. For example, an employer may legally 
refuse to hire married individuals or parents with pre-school-age children. An employer may 
not, however, add an illegitimate condition, such as the sex of the employee. Thus, an em-
ployer may not refuse to hire married women or women with pre-school-age children. E.g., 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 
1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). Contra, Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publish-
ing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (discrimination against men with long hair not cogniza-
ble under Title VII since the interest in the length of one's hair is de minimis). 
96. While many Title VII suits allege discrimination against an entire minority class, suits 
may allege discrimination against only a portion of it. See Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1976). 
97. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
991 (1971) ("[n]or is the fact of discrimination negated by [the defendant's) claim that the 
female employees occupy a unique position so that there is no distinction between members of 
opposite sexes within the job category"). The decision in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125 (1976), holding that pregnancy need not be covered in an employer's disability plan, 
is distinguished on the grounds that pregnancy is both "confined to women" and "significantly 
different from the typical covered disease or disability." 429 U.S. at 136. Sexual harassment, 
on the other hand, is not necessarily confined to one gender. 
98. McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-04 (1973) ("Title VII tolerates 
no racial discrimination, subtle, or otherwise . . . . [N]either does it permit petitioner to use 
respondent's conduct as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by§ 703(a)(l)"), 
99. Sexual harassment is discrimination on the basis of sex whether the advances are heter-
osexual or homosexual, provided the advances are directed at only one sex. If sexual ad-
vances of the same magnitude are directed at both sexes by a bisexual supervisor, there is no 
discrimination. q. Bradford v. Sloan Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1974) 
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sex have been disadvantaged and members of the other sex have not. 
Whether this discrimination is the kind prohibited by Title VII can 
be determined only through an analysis of that law's other elements. 
B. Adverse Effect on Employment Conditions 
Once discrimination on the basis of sex has been demonstrated, 
the next step toward a Title VII action is to prove a causal relation-
ship between that discrimination and an adverse change in the em-
ployee's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment."100 Adverse employment effects can be divided into 
three categories: direct employment actions, constructive discharges, 
and contamination of the working environment. 
Termination of the plaintiffs employment101 is the most obvious 
adverse employment action. Reassignment102 and demotion103 are 
other examples of employer actions with clear employment conse-
qu.ences. Discrimination in employment status, of course, may take 
subtler and less direct forms. Watching an employee more 
closely, 104 assigning undesirable work, 105 discouraging participation 
in company job-mobility programs, 106 failing to require co-workers 
to cooperate where necessary, 107 providing inadequate training, 108 
and withholding recommendations for promotion109 have all been 
termed adverse employment actions in violation of Title VII. In 
other words, acts of omission and indirection are as cognizable as 
(no Title VII violation where supervisor was equally offensive to members of both races). 
Accord, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Barnes v. Costle, 561 
F.2d at 978, 990 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1977). , 
No discrimination on the basis of sex occurs if male and female homosexuals are treated 
similarly. EEOC Decisions 76-67, 76-75 (1976). See generally Siniscalco, Homosexual .Dis-
crimination in Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495 (1976). The crucial inquiry, regard-
less of the sexual orientation of the supervisor and the employee, is whether the advance is 
directed at members of only one sex. If so, discrimination on the basis of sex has occurred 
since such behavior is "conduct which, had the victim been a member of the opposite sex, 
would not have otherwise occurred." Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 
456 (N.D. Cal 1975). 
100. Title VII § 703(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
IOI. This occurred in five of the cases discussed above. See note 79 supra. 
102. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 985 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977): 
103. Dec. No. 71-2725, [1973] EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) ~ 6290 (1971). 
104. Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 418 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
105. Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973). 
106. Reyes v. Mathews, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec.~ 6066 (D.D.C. 1976). 
107. Dec. 71-2725, [1973] EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) ~ 6290 (1971). 
108. Dec. 72-0777, [1973] EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) ~ 6331 (1971). 
109. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1033 (1974); Gillen v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973); Rowe v. General 
Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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firings, demotions, and transfers, though the court's task becomes 
more difficult as the employer's subtlety increases. 
The second category of adverse employment effects involves 
cases in which the employer makes an employee's working condi-
tions so intolerable that the employee is forced to resign. This kind 
of resignation is judicially construed as a constructive dis-
charge110--that the plaintiff is the one to sever the employment rela-
tionship does not bar a Title VII cause of action.111 The existence of 
this category allows victims of sexual harassment whose employers 
h'ave not altered any clearly cognizable condition of employment to 
obtain relief. An employee who resigns before instituting a Title 
VII suit, however, risks losing the job permanently if the subsequent 
suit fails. 112 
It is not certain whether an employee's legally protected terms, 
conditions and privileges of employment include the right to a work-
ing environment uncontaminated by discrimination. 113 The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, however, has consistently 
maintained that an employer must provide an atmosphere free of 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult.114 In a few instances courts have 
approved the principle that an employee's psychological health is 
protected by Title VII, at least when that health is threatened by 
racial or ethnic discrimination. 115 However, courts have intimated 
110. The concept of constructive discharge evolved in the field oflabor relations, where it 
was applied to employer actions designed to discourage union activity. See J.P. Stevens & 
Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972): "Where an employer deliberately makes an 
employee's working conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job because of 
union activities or union membership, the employer has constructively discharged the em-
ployee in violation of§ 8(a)(3) of the Act." Accord, NLRB v. Holly Bra of Cal., Inc., 405 F.2d 
870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969). 
111. Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Assn., 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (constructive 
discharge cognizable). The constructive discharge approach was successfully employed in 
Come to bring the issue of sexual harassment before a court. Although that court disallowed 
the claim on other grounds, the court implicitly accepted the constructive discharge as suffi-
cient proof of an adverse employment effect. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 
161, 162 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
112. Brown v. President, Natl. Maritime Union, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 4546 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) (failure to establish discriminatory conduct renders voluntary resignation nonaction-
able). 
113. See Note, Work Environment Injury Under Title VII, 82 YALE L.J. 1695 (1973). See, 
e.g., cases cited in note 116 i'!fra. 
114. Dec. No. 74-05, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 834 (1973); Dec. No. 72-1561, [1973) EEOC 
DECISIONS (CCH)_ ~ 6354 (1?72); Dec. No. ?1~2598, (19?3] EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) ~ 6284 
(1971). For a detailed analysIS of the EEOC s mterpretat1on of the working environment as a 
condition of employment, see SI N.Y.U.L. REV. 148, 153-59 (1976). 
115. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972): 
Therefo_re, it i:5 my belief th~t employees' psychological as well as economic fringes are 
s_tatutorily ~D:titled to protection fr~~ emplC?yer ab~e, and that the phrase "terms, condi-
ti<_>ns! o_r pnvileg~ of employment, . m Sectio~ 703 IS an _expans!ve concept which sweeps 
within its protective ambit tlie practice of creating a working env1ronment heavily charged 
witll etllnic or racial discrimination. 
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that they will require clear and substantial proof of claims alleging a 
discriminatory atmosphere. 116 Support for the application of Title 
VII to discriminatory working environments may be inf erred from 
the Supreme Court's decision in Trajficante v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance. 117 The Court held that a resident of an apartment com-
plex has standing to sue its management if it excluded minority 
groups. Otherwise, the Court held, the tenants might be deprived of 
the benefit of integrated housing and interracial association in viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Acts of 1968.118 This implicit recognition of 
a statutorily protected right to a nondiscriminatory housing environ-
ment appears analogous to a right to a nondiscriminatory working 
environment protected by Title VII. The propriety of this analogy is 
evidenced by the Court's reliance upon a Title VII case~ 19 in 
Trajficante .120 
Moreover, several circuits have explicitly held that employees are 
entitled to a working environment which does not inhibit interracial 
association.121 If an employee has a right to such a working envi-
ronment, Title VII should also be taken to forbid the exclusion of 
employees of a particular color, national origin, religion, or gender. 
The extent to which discrimination short of exclusion infringes upon 
this associational privilege, however, has not been defined. For ex-
ample, it is not clear that the Supreme Court would extend the right 
to a nondiscriminatory housing environment to include the right to a 
housing environment free of racial insults or harassment. The right 
presumably would have to be extended that far if the interraci~-
Accord, Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); EEOc1v. International 
Longshoremen's Assn., 511 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975). 
116. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972): 
I do not wish to be interpreted as holdini that an employer's mere utterance of an ethnic 
or racial eEithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee falls within the pro-
scription of Section 703. l3ut by the same token l am simply not willing to hold that a 
discriminatory atmosphere could under no set of circumstances ever constitute an unlaw-
ful employment ,practice. One can readily envision working environments so heavily :eoI-
luted with discnmination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological 
stability of minority group workers, and I think: Section 703 of Title VII was auned at the 
eradication of such noxious practices. 
q., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (denying cause of 
action for racially discriminatory atmosphere). "As a class claim, [racially discriminatory at-
mosphere] is virtually incapable of proof in all but the most blatant of situations. Such a 
nebulous concept-that of 'atmosphere'-is not susceptible to any accepted methods of proof 
in a court of law." 439 F. Supp. at 74. 
117. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970). 
119. Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971). 
120. 409 U.S. at 209. For an extensive discussion of the application of Trqfficante to Title 
VII, see EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452-54 (6th Cir. 1977). · 
121. E.g., Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 
(1977); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Note, supra note 113, at 
1695 (1973). 
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association analogy is to reach sexual harassment. A cause of action 
based on contamination of the working environment would proba-
bly require proof of a persistent and oppressive discriminatory at-
mosphere; 122 an isolated incident would be insufficient to establish 
such an "atmosphere." 
Although the law on the working environment as a condition of 
employment is still incipient, 123 because of Title VIl's remedial pur-
poses, courts should read the phrase "terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment" broadly to include the ambience of the workplace. 
All employees in the office, not just the specific targets, are damaged 
by the discomfort, degradation, and stigma caused by the discrimi-
natory work environment sexual harassment produces. Thus, when-
ever a plaintiff can demonstrate that sexual advances have 
contaminated the working environment, a claim of sexual harass-
ment should be cognizable. 
C. Employer Pattern or Practice 
Title VII provides both for causes of action for aggrieved individ-
uals124 and for class action suits.125 Although plaintiffs in a class 
action must show that there was a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion, 126 individual plaintiffs need not do so-an isolated incident of 
impermissible discrimination will support an action.127 Thus the 
courts have erred to the extent that they have required proof of a 
122. See note 116 supra. 
123. One re~nt case suggests Title VII applies to the "entire scope of the working environ-
ment," Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), but an-
other criticizes the concept of atmosphere as "nebulous" and "not susceptible to any accepted 
methods of proof in a court oflaw," Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 
(E.D. Pa. 1977). 
124. Title VII§§ 703, 717, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-16 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), 
125. Title VII § 706. The plaintiff may bring and pursue both an individual and a class 
action suit simultaneously, and dismissal of the individual suit will not bar the plaintiff from 
pursuing the class action suit. Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Roberts v. 
Union Co., 487 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973); Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. 
La. 1976). 
126. International Bhd. ofTeamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,336 (1977); Dickerson 
v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 65 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol 
Div.), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
127. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281-82 n.8 (1976). Senator 
Humphrey distinguished "pattern or practice" from "isolated acts" as follows: 
[A] _pattern or practice would be present only when the denial of rights consists of 
something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a gener-
alized nature. There would be a pattern or practice if, for example, a number of compa-
nies or persons in the same industry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels 
or restaurants practices racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its 
system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by the stat-
ute. 
110 CONG. REC. 14270 (1964). 
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pattern or practice of discrimination in order to establish a condition 
of employment in an individual suit. 128 
D. The Source of Harassment and the Employer's Liability 
An employer's liability for sexual harassment depends partly on 
the organizational status of the harasser. 129 Although sexual harass-
ment cases have involved direct supervisors, two classes of potential 
harassers can be distinguished: supervisory and managerial person-
nel (i.e., employees responsible for employment decisions), and non-
supervisory, nonmanagerial personnel.130 
Although no judicial consensus has emerged from sexual harass-
ment cases, Title VII cases involving other types of discrimination 
generally hold the employer liable for discriminatory acts of supervi-
sors and managers. 131 Employers have been held liable even when 
they were unaware of the discrimination, 132 even when they had 
anti-discrimination policies, 133 and even though they had exemplary 
anti-discrimination records. 134 Courts have stated only rarely, and 
then in dicta, that an employer under some circumstances might not 
be liable for supervisory discrimination.135 
Nevertheless, several courts confronted with allegations of sexual 
harassment by a supervisor have used a traditional and narrow 
agency analysis to gauge the employer's liability.136 Such an analy-
128. See discussion of cases at note 87 supra. 
129. 42 Mo. L. REv. 613, 614 (1977). 
130. A third possibility is that the harasser owns the business. A sole proprietor who ha-
rasses an employee is liable under the wording of Title VII. § 703(a)(l}, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(l) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Similarly, discriminatory treatment resulting from the collec-
tive action of the individuals composing a partnership will expose the entity to Title VII liabil-
ity. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (partnership may 
be held liable for prohibited discrimination in selection of partners); Note, Applicability of 
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. REV. 282 
(1977). 
131. See e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977) (em-
ployer liable as a principal for violations of Title VII by supervisor); Young v. Southwestern 
Sav. & Loan Assn., 509 F.2d 140, 144 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (employer liable for supervisor's acts 
where consistent with supervisor's apparent authority); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical 
Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 723 (6th Cir. 1972) (employer liable for acts of lower level manage-
ment); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) (corporation liable for 
discriminatory promotion recommendations of its foremen). 
132. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1972). 
133. Macey v. World Airways, Inc., 13 EMPL. PRAc. DEc. ~ 11,581 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
134. Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972). 
135. Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United 
States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala. 1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
817 (1977). 
136. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on 
procedural grounds, 562 F. 2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. 
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sis, this Note suggests, is unnecessary and misleading.137 
An employer is vicariously liable at common law for acts of 
agents only if the agents acted within the scope of their employment 
or if the employer ratified their acts. 138 Defining "employer" in Sec-
tion 701 of Title VII to include "any agent of such a person" would 
mean little if it left unchanged the scope of the employer's liability 
under common-law vicarious liability concepts. 139 Section 701 may 
well represent Congress's awareness of the difficulties of proving an 
agency relationship under the common-law rules, especially when 
the employer is an institution and not a person. It would be consis-
tent with the broad remedial purpose of Title VII for Congress to 
have imposed per se liability on the employer for acts of those cus-
tomarily considered its agents. 140 Since under traditional agency 
analysis a master is generally not liable for acts of servants outside 
the scope of their employment,141 and since "conduct is within the 
scope of employment only if the servant is actuated to some extent 
by an intent to serve his master,"142 it would be the rare Title VII 
case in which an agency relationship would exist under that analy-
sis.143 Furthermore, conduct "different in kind from that author-
ized" is outside ~he scope of employment under traditional agency 
law.144 An employer would seldom authorize a supervisor to dis-
criminate in violation of Title VII; more often an employer, if it ad-
dresses the subject at all, authorizes a supervisor only to act 
consistently with Title VII. Similarly, few employers knowingly rat-
ify supervisory discrimination in violation of Title VII. Thus, tradi-
Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mac-
Kinnon, J., concurring). 
137. Courts have also disagreed as to the applicability of the doctrine ofrespondeat supe-
rior to other civil rights statutes. Compare Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 
1971), and Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970), with Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 
1271 (8th Cir. 1973), and Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966). For implicit 
support of a traditional agency analysis in the sexual harassment area, see 17 S. TEX. L.J. 409, 
412, 414 (1976). 
138. Note, Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their Employees: The Negligent 
Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717 (1977); 29 OKLA. L. REV. 946 (1976). 
139. The agent may of course be personally liable. See text at notes 162-71 infra. This, 
however, does not resolve the issue of an employer's liability. 
140. This more expansive view of employer liability was taken by the court in Williams v. 
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 (D.D.C. 1976). 
141. REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958). 
142. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235, Comment a (1958). 
143. Although the court in Corne did not refer to agency theory, it implicitly relied on this 
point when it noted that the supervisor's conduct did not benefit the employer. Come v. 
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). The concurring opinion in Barnes explicitly relied on it. Barnes 
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
144. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1958). 
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tional agency analysis tends to insulate employers from liability in 
most supervisory discrimination cases, 145 a result Congress surely 
could not have intended. 
But even traditional agency analysis is not confined to the two 
tests discussed above. Even if the supervisor is acting outside the 
scope of his employment, the employer may be held liable for his 
acts if it is negligent in supervising him, if the supervisor is carrying 
out an employer's nondelegable duty, if an employee has relied on 
the apparent authority of the supervisor, or if the employer facilitates 
the supervisor's wrong by making him its agent. 146 
First, an employer should be liable if it negligently allows a su-
pervisor sexually to harass employees.147 The employer's duty 
should be to take reasonable steps to insure the supervisor's compli-
ance with these directions. 148 Reasonable steps might include estab-
lishing grievance procedures for employees, requiring supervisors to 
document their reasons for adverse job actions, and having exit in-
terviews for discharged employees conducted by company represent-
atives other than the supervisor. 
Second, an employer may be liable if the employee has relied on 
the apparent authority of the supervisor to act on behalf of the em-
ployer or if the supervisor's discriminatory conduct has been facili-
tated by the existence of the agency relationship. 149 The employer's 
liability is premised upon placing the supervisor in a position to 
make employment decisions. Having provided the supervisor with 
145. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995-1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concurring opinion). 
An employer may be liable under agency theory if the employer had "constructive knowledge" 
of (fomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977)) or gave "tacit 
approval" to (Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1976)) the agent's 
act. 
146. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b), (c) & (d) (1958). 
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958). 
148. For a view which recognizes an employer's prima facie liability but which imposes 
less rigorous steps to ensure supervisors' compliance, see Industrial Linens Supply Co. v. Mis-
souri Commn. on Human Rights, 539 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (decided under 
state legislation similar to Title VII, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 296.010-296.070 (1969)): 
It is unnecessary for the purpose of this opinion to decide whether either the doctrine of 
apparent agency or the doctrine of responcleat superior should be applied in full riior in 
proceedings to enforce this type of governmental regulation. For present purposes 1t suf-
fices to say that an employer 1S prima facie liable for the acts of its employee done in the 
course of his duti_es, and the employer to escape that liability must at feast undertake the 
burden of showing that the employee's acts· of discrintination were contrary to express 
instructions not to discrintinate. 
149. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 265 (1958): 
§ 265. General Rule 
(1) A master or other principal is subject to liability for torts which result from reliance 
upon, or belief in, statements or other conduct within an agent's apparent authority. 
(2) Unless there has been reliance, the principal is not liable in tort for conduct of a 
servant or other agent merely because it is within his apparent authority or apparent scope 
of employment. 
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the opportunity to fire or hire, the employer must bear the conse-
quences of discriminatory uses of that authority. 150 
Third, and perhaps most significantly, Title VII should be read as 
imposing on the employer a nondelegable duty to maintain an estab-
lishment free of unlawful employment practices.151 This reading is 
supported by judicial interpretations of other federal statutes. 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 152 for example, courts have imposed a 
nondelegable duty on owners of real estate to sell it in a nondiscrimi-
natory fashion; the owner is liable for all discriminatory acts of 
agents and managers.153 Analogous employment cases include those 
decided under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 154 which pro-
hibits child labor. 155 Courts, confronted with violations by supervi-
150. Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971) (employee discrimina-
torily discharged on basis of race by regional accounting manager). 
When American Oil gave its Regional Accounting Manager authority to fire employees, it 
also accepted responsibility to remedy any harm caused by his unlawful exercise of that 
authority. The modem corporate entity consists of the individuals who manage it, and 
little, if any progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will be made if the 
corporate employer is able to hide behind the shield of iniliv1dual employee action. 
332 F. Supp. at 436. Judge MacKinnon, in his concurring opinion in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F. 
2d 978, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977), takes the opposite view, suggesting that this .exception to the 
scope of employment rule is inapplicable to these circumstances. He does, however, agree 
that "the supervisor has been provided with an opportunity by the agency." 561 F. 2d at 996. 
151. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 214 (1958). 
§ 214. Failure of Principal To Perform Non-delegable Duty 
A master or other principal who is under a duty to provide protection for or to have care 
used to protect others or their property and who confides the performance of such duty to 
a servant or other person is subject to liability to such others for harm caused to them by 
the failure of such agent to perform the duty. 
Judge MacKinnon, however, dismissed this consideration without any discussion. Barnes v. 
Costle, 561 F. 2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
152. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, §§ 801-12, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-12 (1977). Under 
§ 804, it is "unlawful [t]o refuse to sell ... a dwelling to any person because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin." 
153. Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 896-97 (N.D. Ohio 
1977): 
Thus the Court has no difficulty in finding the defendant [employee] liable to the plaintiff. 
Under the law, such a findinjl; rmpels the same judgment aga!IlSt the defendant Company 
and . . . its president, for it IS clear that their duty not to discriminate is a non-delegable 
one, . . . and that in this area a COIJX>ration and its officers are responsible for the acts of a 
subordinate employee, even though these acts were neither directed nor authorized. . . . 
This ruling troubles the Court to some extent, for it seems harsh to punish innocent and 
well-intentioned employers for the disobedient wrongful acts of their employees. How-
ever, great evils require strong remedies, and the old rules of the law require that when 
one of two innocent people must suffer, the one whose acts permitted the wrong to occur is 
the one to bear the burden of it. 
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modified on 
other grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975): ''The discriminatory conduct of an apartment 
manager or rental agent is, as a general rule, attributable to the owner and property manager 
of the apartment complex, both under the doctrine of respondeat superior and because the duty 
to obey the law is non-delegable." Accord, Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. 
Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 742 (6th Cir. 1974). 
154. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
19 (1976)). 
155. 29 u.s.c. §§ 203(1), 212 (1976). 
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sory personnel, found a societal interest sufficient to justify imposing 
a nondelegable duty on the employer. 156 The broad remedial and 
social objectives of Title VII should command similar judicial re-
spect. 
There is, of course, a second group of potential harass-
ers-nonsupervisory, nonmanagerial employees. Apparently no Ti-
tle VII claim based upon sexual harassment by a member of this 
group has reached the courts. However, there is sufficient precedent 
from other kinds of Title VII cases to conclude that traditional 
agency tests of acquiescence and ratification by the employer or its 
agent are the most appropriate ways of determining employer liabil-
ity for sexual harassment by nonmanagerial employees.157 Under 
the "atmosphere" theory of liability, where a nonsupervisory em-
ployee has sexually harassed a fellow employee and the employer or 
its agents knew or should have known 158 of the harassment but 
failed to take remedial measures, the employer should be liable 
where the other tests of liability under Title VII are met. 159 Unlike 
those cases in which supervisory personnel are the harassers, 160 how-
ever, prompt investigation and remedial action upon discovery may 
156. Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 146 F.2d 325, 328 (8th Cir. 1945): 
[f)he Act contains no suggestion that the mere declaration by corporate officers of a pol-
icy of obedience to the law, or the absence of a grant of authority by them to the hiring 
foremen to disobey it, leaves the court with no duty of enforcement. On the contrary, sucli 
corporations must be held strictly accountable for the child labor violations of subordi-
nates. Their duty does not end with mere directive communication to such subordi-
nates. . . . [T]he mandate of the statute is directed to the employer and "he may not 
escape it by dele~atin& it to others." The "duty rests on the employer to inquire into the 
conditions prevailing m his business. He does not rid himself of that duty because the 
extent of tlie business may preclude his personal supervision, and compel reliance on 
subordinates. He must then stand or fall with those whom he selects to act for him. . . . 
(T]he duty must be held personal, or we nullify the statute .... " 
(Footnotes omitted.) Accord, Shultz v. Salinas, 416 F.2d 412, 414 (5th Cir. 1969); Goldberg v. 
Kickapoo Prairie Broadcasting Co., 288 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1961). 
157. See, e.g., Washington v. Safeway Corp., 467 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1972); Croker v. 
Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. 
Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 
1975). 
158. The "reason to know" provision has been added here to clarify the duty of a reason-
ably prudent employer or agent. Its presence makes unnecessary the difficult task of proving 
actual knowledge and precludes an employer from ignoring discrimination in order to avoid 
liability for it. 
159. "[A)cts of fellow employees are not usually bases of claims against the employer. 'Li-
ability can only be premised on the employer's failure to take reasonable steps to prevent 
racial harassment of which its upper level management is aware.'" Dickerson v. United States 
Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 75 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (quoting Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 
437 F. Supp. l 138, I 192 (E.D. Pa. 1977)). 
160. Prompt remedial action by the employer following its discovery of supervisory dis-
crimination may, of course, effectively resolve and settle Title VII discrimination claims, and 
while such action cannot relieve the employer of legal liability under agency theory, it should 
sometimes mitigate the employer's damages. This approach encourages employers to investi-
gate and reconcile discrimination claims. 
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in some cases relieve the employer of Title VII liability. 161 In other 
cases prompt remedial action may mitigate the employer's damages. 
E. The Agent's Liability Under Title VII 
Although this recourse is rarely used, an agent of an employer 
other than the federal government162 is directly liable under Title 
VII for prohibited acts of employment discrimination, 163 since Title 
VII's definition of "employer" includes "any agent of such a per-
son."164 If the individual guilty of discrimination is in that "fiduci-
ary relation which results from the manifestation of consent [by the 
employer] to [the individual] that the [individual] shall act on his 
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the [individual] so 
to act," the individual is an agent of the employer. 165 
Most cases which have considered this issue have only reached 
the procedural question whether the agent was a proper defend-
ant.166 Of the courts which have ruled on an agent's Title VII liabil-
ity, one issued an injunction against an agent167 and another assessed 
nominal damages, court costs, and the plaintiffs attorney's fees 
against the agent and employer jointly.168 Although judicial sup-
port is not abundant, these cases and the language of Title VII justify 
an agent's direct liability under Title VII. Personal liability is espe-
cially appropriate in sexual harassment cases because of the unusu-
ally personal nature of the offense, the possibility that the offense has 
harmed the employer as well as the employee (because the offense 
easily disrupts the harmony of the workplace), and because of the 
difficulty the employer may encounter in preventing and detecting 
such offenses. The threat of personal monetary and injunctive lia-
161. Marlowe v. Fisher Body Div. of Gen. Motors, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1357, 1358 
(E.D. Mich. 1975). 
162. Keeler v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 386, 387 (N.D. Ga. 1975): 
[U]nder the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), these federal defend-
ants may only be sued in their official capacity, not individually ••.. This is because § 
2000e-16(c) requires that a suit by a federal employee alleging racial discrimination be 
maintained against the head of the department which employs the plaintiff employee. 
163. Tillman v. City of Boaz, 548 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1977); Curran v. Portland Superin-
tending School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. 
Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Harbert v. Rapp, 419 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Padilla v. 
Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.M. 1974). 
164. Title VII, § 70l(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
165. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(3) (1958). 
166. See, e.g., Tillman v. City of Boaz, 548 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1977); Curran v. Portland 
Superintending School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977); Munford v. James T. Barnes 
& Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Harbert v. Rapp, 419 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Okla. 
1976); Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec.~ 10,135 (D. Md. 1975). 
167. Padilla v. Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.M. 1974). 
168. Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
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bility for prohibited discrimination could, furthermore, reduce sex-
ual harassment by supervisors more effectively than suits against the 
employer. This principle would, however, be inapplicable to nonsu-
pervisory employees. Only the employer or agent who knew or 
should have known of such activity169 and failed to remedy it would 
be liable. 
That an agent may be liable does not, of course, relieve the em-
ployer of liability; the employer would remain jointly and severally 
liable for the discriminatory conduct.170 The liability of the em-
ployer assures the successful plaintiff of adequate monetary relief 
and of those kinds of relief, such as reinstatement, which are beyond 
the agent's control.171 
F. Potential P/ainttffs 
The most obvious potential plaintiff is the woman 172 who refuses 
a sexual advance. Although the seven sexual harassment cases 
heard to date involve such plaintiffs, they are not the only potential 
plaintiffs under Title VII. In every set of circumstances in which an 
employee receives a sexual advance followed by an employment ef-
fect, whether adverse or favorable, some class of employees will be 
aggrieved and thus be potential Title VII plaintiffs. 
A woman confronted by sexual advances but who receives no 
extraordinary advantage over male employees should be able to pur-
sue a claim of employment discrimination on the ground that she is 
required to provide sexual favors to maintain parity with male em-
ployees. Her claim would be that an additional qualification had 
been-imposed on one sex but not on the other, a situation analogous 
169. The employer's liability is discussed in text at notes 129-61 supra. 
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 217A, Comment on Clause (a) (1958): "A 
p_rincipal is.Jointly and severally liable with the agent for whose tortious conduct he is respon-
sible .••• 
171. See Tillman v. City of Boaz, 548 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1977) (order dismissing cla1m 
against city for lack of jurisdiction under Title VII reversed). "[T]he charge was made against 
both the Mayor [who terminated plaintiff], acting as a city official, and the City. Further, the 
reinstatement requested by [plaintiff] could only be granted by the City as her employer." 548 
F.2d at 594. 
An analogy may be drawn to cases in which unions are joined as defendants in suits 
against employers in order to allow the plaintiff complete relief and to protect the unions' own 
interests. See Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Evans v. Sher-
aton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(l). 
172. For purposes of clarity in this section, "woman" is used in place of "the aggrieved." 
Corresponding references to the sex opposite that of the aggrieved are phrased in the male 
gender. These labels are employed only for clarity; the analysis is equally applicable if the 
labels are interchanged, or if both individuals are of the same sex. 
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to one in which blacks but not whites were required to take a test to 
be eligible for promotion. 
Where a sexually cooperative woman not only acquired parity 
with males but garnered an extraordinary employment advantage, 
males should be able to maintain an action for being denied the op-
portunity to make similar progress. Even if the target of the sexual 
advance were to decline the opportunity, males might still maintain 
their action, since they would have been denied the extraordinary 
employment opportunity offered the woman. 
Finally, if a court acknowledges that all employees are entitled to 
a working environment free of sexual harassment, 173any employee 
deprived of that benefit would of course have a cause of action. 
Recognition of this group of plaintiffs would expand substantially 
the volume of sexual harassment claims brought before the courts. 
G. Employer Responses to Title VII Sexual Harassment Claims 
Besides disproving the existence of the prerequisites for a sexual 
harassment cause of action outlined earlier in this Note, 174 an em-
ployer can avoid liability under Title VII in several ways. First, an 
employer may not be within Title VII's jurisdictional standards: 175 
very small or temporary businesses may be exempted from coverage. 
Second, if the employer can show that the employment action of 
which the employee complains was in no way based on impermissi-
ble discrimination or retaliation, the employer will have deprived the 
employee of an essential element of her cause of ac.tion. 176 That is, 
if the plaintiff was subjected to sexual advances but was terminated 
for completely independent and valid reasons, discrimination may 
be found by a court, but the plaintiff will not be entitled to any relief 
for the legitimate discharge. 177 
173. See text at notes 117-23 supra for the suggestion that the right to an interracial envi-
ronment might include a right under Title VII to a work environment free of illegal discrimi-
nation. 
174. See text at notes 99-109 supra. 
175. Title VII sets down jurisdictional standards by defining an employer in§ 70l(b) as "a 
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
176. See Lewis v. General Motors Corp., 557 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1977); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). · 
177. Cf. Compston v. Bordc;n, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (court awarded 
nominal damages because supervisor demeaned employee's religion, but it awarded no rein-
statement or back pay, since discharge was not motivated by discrimination against that reli-
gion). 
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Finally, the employer can deny that discrimination on the basis 
of sex was an element in the sexual advance. This defense would be 
confined to situations where a bisexual supervisor harasses subordi-
nates of both sexes.178 
Employer actions subsequent to the discrimination, such as ter-
minating the discriminating supervisor, which fall short of restoring 
the status quo ante cannot, of course, be grounds for denying the 
plaintiff relief.179 Nor will unilateral relief offered to an individual 
plaintiff defeat a meritorious class action. 18° Furthermore, if an em-
ployer discriminatorily denied the plaintiff a promotion, a later pro-
motion of another employee of the same sex181 or of a better 
qualified employee of the opposite sex182 will not defeat a plaintiff's 
otherwise meritorious claim. The crucial question is whether dis-
crimination occurred; defenses must be based on the employer's 
treatment of the plaintiff. Subsequent treatment of third parties, 
however, may be considered by a court in fashioning an appropriate 
remedy. 183 
H. Consequences of the Sexual Harassment Cause of Action 
The practical consequences of finding sexual harassment a legiti-
mate basis for a Title VII cause of action are difficult to predict. On 
the positive side, victims of sexual harassment may be able safely to 
protest, knowing that Title VII prohibits both sexual harassment and 
employer retaliation for complaints of such conduct. Supervisors 
personally liable for sexual harassment or for acquiescence in other 
178. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 
654, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976). An analogy can be drawn to those cases in which employees of 
both sexes or races were subjected to other kinds of offensive conduct. See, e.g., Gilliam v. 
City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842, 854 (D. Neb. 1975), qffd, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975) (all 
employees, regardless of race or sex, were subjected to abusive treatment); Bradford v. Sloan 
Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1974). 
179. Reyes v. Mathews, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ I 1,323 (D.D.C. 1976). 
180. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 
(1976). 
181. Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1976). 
182. Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973). 
183. One other employer defense deserves attention. There is some support for the pro-
position that if "sex plus" discrimination only insignificantly affects employment opportuni-
ties, then the employer will not be found in violation of Title VII. See Dodge v. Giant Food, 
Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (grooming standards which differed on the basis of sex not 
violative of Title VII). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
337 (1976). This principle has been limited to cases in which courts have found no distinct 
employment disadvantages for either sex and in which the individual right infringed upon is 
not fundamental. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d at 1337. Therefore, this defense would 
probably not be available to an employer in a sexual harassment case-such discrimination 
does produce obvious and significant disadvantages for one sex. See Sprogis v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). 
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employees' sexual advances may be deterred from using their au-
thority in a sexually coercive manner or from tolerating such behav-
ior by their subordinates. The possibility of a Title VII claim may 
prompt employers to promulgate and strictly enforce policies against 
sexual harassment and to provide an effective grievance procedure 
for reporting and investigating complaints of it. 
The menace of numerous, frivolous claims is the most often 
fe<:1-red consequence of recognizing this cause of action. 184 But that 
menace, which exists when any type of discrimination is made un-
lawful; should not preclude meritorious claims and perpetuate barri-
ers to true equal employment. As in any Title VII case, the plaintiff 
has the burden of establishing a prima facie case. The employer 
may invoke the defenses discussed above185 and may attempt to dis-
prove the factual allegations. Further, the traditional judicial pro-
tective devices-motions to dismiss, summary judgments, and 
directed verdicts-may help prevent protracted litigation of clearly 
frivolous claims. Finally, courts have sought to deter frivolous Title 
VII suits by assessing plaintiffs guilty of instituting them with de-
fendant's attorney fees. 186 In sum, the solution to the problem of 
frivolous claims is not to disallow all claims of sexual harassment 
regardless of their merit, but rather to employ the traditional judicial 
safeguards. 187 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although all of the seven cases of sexual harassment discussed in 
this Note were based on the same statute, the courts applied different 
legal principles and rationales. Six of the cases recognized a limited 
184. Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. at 236 ("flirtations of the smallest order 
would give rise to liability"); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. at 164 (employer 
would be required to hire "employees who were asexual"). 
185. See text at notes 174-83 supra. 
186. Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976); United States Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975); Copeland v. Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 
1977). See Title VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(l970 & Supp. V 1975). 
187. Accord, Barnes v. Costle. 561 F.2d at 994 n.81; Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 422 F. Supp. at 556; 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 148, 162-66 (1976). Similarly, traditional judicial 
relief-actual damages and injunctive orders-is available under Title VII. The courts also 
enjoy some flexibility in awarding Title VII relief. They may safeguard against renewed dis-
crimination, Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Pa. 1973), mod!fted on 
other grounds, 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977), and use creative 
kinds of remedies, e.g., requiring supervisors to be trained in the law and application of Title 
VII. Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 555 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1977). Courts can thus 
provide adequate relief for any Title VII plaintiff, including victims of sexual harassment. 
Comment, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. at 166 (1976). See generally Comment, Affirmative Relief Under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 373 (1977); Comment, Title VIL· 
Making .Discrimination Victi1!1.f Whole, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 109 (1976). 
May 1978) Sexual Harassment and Title VII 1035 
cause of action for sexual harassment. But courts should apply 
more liberally the strong precedent expressed in other types of Title 
VII cases in reaching their conclusions. That precedent suggests 
that sexual advances discriminate on the basis of sex, that a resultant 
deleterious employment effect constitutes sexual harassment in viola-
tion of Title VII, that a pattern of discrimination need not be proved 
in actions by ~dividuals, and that the employer may be liable for the 
discriminatory acts ~f supervisors. Further, judicial recognition that 
a supervisor may. b~·held personally liable under Title VII, that the 
employer or supervisor may be held liable for acquiescence in sexual 
advances by nonsupervisory employees, and that several groups of 
potential plaintiffs may exist in each instance of sexual harassment, 
should substantially eliminate sexual cooperation as a condition of 
employment. 
The goal of such a use of Title VII is not to create a sterile, aso-
cial, asexual working environment; it is to prohibit the extortionate 
use of the employer's power. The fact that the harassment alleged is 
of a sexual nature is not singled out for disproportionate attention; 
any demand based on prohibited discrimination and with deleteri-
ous employment effects would be equally cognizable. The opportu-
nity to recognize such a cause of action, therefore, should be 
welcomed by the courts as an opportunity to further Title VII's ob-
jective of eliminating invidious and arbitrary barriers to employ-
ment. •ss 
188. Three sexual harassment cases have arisen in the federal courts since the completion 
of this Note. In Neeley v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 482 
(W.D. Okla. 1978), a vice-president had told a female employee dirty jokes and placed his 
hands on her shoulders while explaining work duties. The court held there had been no viola-
tion of Title VII since the defendant had a strictly enforced policy against sexual harassment, 
the employer did not know of the vice-president's behavior, and continued benefits or employ-
ment were not conditioned on the plaintiff's acquiescence. In both Rinkel v. Associated Pipe-
line Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alas. 1978), and Stringer v. Commonwealth 
of Pa. Dept. of Community Affairs, Bureau of Human Resources, 446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 
1978), causes of action for sexual harassment were recognized, for a failure to hire and for a 
discharge, respectively, in reliance on Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 
(3d Cir. 1977). 
